

Pricing Methodology for Gas Transmission Services

From 1 October 2025

Pursuant to the *Gas Transmission Information Disclosure Determination 2012*



Introduction

First Gas Limited (Firstgas) owns and operates New Zealand's gas transmission network, comprising 2,519 kilometres of high-pressure pipelines. These assets are critical to the nation's energy infrastructure, transporting substantial volumes of natural gas from production facilities in the Taranaki region to distribution networks and large-scale users across the North Island of New Zealand.

Our transmission business plays a pivotal role in meeting the diverse energy needs of industrial, commercial, and residential customers. Natural gas transported through our network supports a range of applications—including industrial processes, power generation, and commercial operations, as well as residential uses such as space heating, water heating, and cooking.

We remain committed to ensuring that gas continues to be a competitive and reliable energy option. This includes operating efficiently and sustainably within the regulated price-quality framework established by the Commerce Commission.

Information disclosure

This document is the Pricing Methodology for gas transmission services prepared pursuant to clause 2.4 of the *Gas Transmission Information Disclosure Determination 2012* (consolidating all amendments as at 3 April 2018), issued by the Commerce Commission on 3 April 2018 (the ID Determination).

This Pricing Methodology covers the 12-month pricing year from 1 October 2025 to 30 September 2026 (gas year 2026, GY2026).

A signed director certificate is provided with this Pricing Methodology.

This Pricing Methodology was approved on 13 August 2025.

Further information

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Disclaimer

For presentation purposes, some numbers in this document have been rounded. This may cause small discrepancies or rounding inconsistencies when aggregating some of the information presented in the document. These discrepancies do not affect the overall calculations which are based on more detailed information.

Glossary

Act:	Commerce Act 1986.
Commission:	The Commerce Commission who is charged with monitoring compliance with the <i>Commerce Act 1986</i> , including price-quality regulation and information disclosure requirements for regulated businesses.
CPI:	Consumer Price Index.
CRF:	Capacity Reservation Fee, a charge applied for each GJ of reserved capacity under the Gas Transmission Code (GTC)
Delivery Point (DP):	A facility (including any associated land and equipment) at which one or more Shippers can take Gas from the Transmission System.
DPP	Default Price-Quality Path
Forecast Allowable Revenue	The revenue Firstgas is allowed to earn during the pricing year under the <i>Default Price-Quality Path (PQ) Determination</i> .
GJ:	Gigajoule, a unit of energy.
GTB:	The Gas Transmission Business owned by Firstgas.
ID Determination:	<i>Gas Transmission Information Disclosure Determination 2012</i> , consolidating all amendments as of 3 April 2018, published by the Commerce Commission.
GTC	Gas Transmission Code.
GY2026:	Gas year from 1 October 2025 to 30 September 2026.
Incremental cost:	The cost of providing a defined service to an additional consumer or group of consumers, given that service is already provided to other consumers.
Input Methodologies:	<i>Gas Transmission Services Input Methodologies Determination 2012</i> consolidating all amendments as of 3 April 2018, published by the Commerce Commission.
Maximum Flow:	The peak flow rate or capacity of a transmission asset (e.g., pipeline or DP) or connection point.
MPOC:	Maui Pipeline Operating Code.
OATIS	The technology platform supporting operations under the MPOC and GTC.

Pass-through costs	As defined in clause 3.1.2(1) of the <i>Gas Transmission Services Input Methodologies Determination 2012</i> , pass-through costs include: a) Rates on system fixed assets paid or payable by a GTB to a local authority under the Local Government (Rating) Act 2002; and b) Levies payable: (i) Under regulations made under the Commerce Act; (ii) Under regulations made under the Gas Act 1992; or (iii) By all members of the Electricity and Gas Complaints Commissioner Scheme by virtue of their membership; or c) A cost associated with the supply of gas transmission services, outside the control of the gas transmission business, not treated as a recoverable cost, and appropriate to be passed through to consumers
PQ Determination:	<i>Gas Transmission Services Default Price-Quality Path Determination 2022</i> , NZCC20, 31 May 2022.
Price Component	The various tariffs, fees and charges that constitute the components of the total price paid, or payable, by a consumer.
Pricing Principles:	The pricing principles specified in clause 2.5.2 of the <i>Gas Transmission Services Input Methodologies Determination 2012</i> .
Pricing Region:	A group of Delivery Points with the same CRF (as set out in section 3.2).
Pricing Strategy:	A decision made by the Directors of the GTB on the GTB's plans or strategy to amend or develop prices in the future and recorded in writing.
Receipt Point (RP):	A facility (including any associated land and equipment) at which a producer injects Gas into the Transmission System.
Recoverable costs	As defined in clause 3.1.3 of the <i>Gas Transmission Services Input Methodologies Determination 2012</i> , recoverable costs include 12 different types of costs that a gas transmission business can directly recoup through its prices.
Shipper:	A person named as a shipper in a Transmission Services Agreement with Firstgas.
Stand alone cost:	The cost of providing a defined service or group of services to a particular consumer or group of consumers, without providing any other services or serving any other consumers.
Target revenue:	The revenue the GTB expects to receive during the pricing year, as described in section 2.1 of this document.
TOU:	Time of Use.
TPM:	Transmission Pricing Methodology.
Transmission System:	The entirety of Firstgas' Maui and Non-Maui gas transmission pipelines

Background documents

All regulatory documents relating to transmission pricing are available on Firstgas' website here:

<https://firstgas.co.nz/about-us/regulatory/transmission/>

All prices are set to comply with the revenue path set in the PQ Determination for gas transmission. Further details are set out in the *Ex-ante price-setting compliance statement* for the year commencing 1 October 2025 that is also available on the Regulatory page of the Firstgas website.

Table of Contents

1	Overview of Firstgas' transmission system	7
1.1	Firstgas transmission system	7
1.2	Industry context for gas transmission pricing	7
1.3	Regulatory environment for gas transmission	7
1.4	Approach to pricing methodologies for GY2026	8
2	Overview of requirements	11
2.1	Compliance with revenue cap for GTB	11
2.2	Regulatory requirements for a pricing methodology disclosure	12
3	Pricing methodology	13
3.1	Pricing under the MPOC	13
3.2	Pricing under the GTC	14
3.3	Determining the Target Revenue for the GTB	16
3.4	Transmission pricing assumptions	17
3.5	Approach to prices and revenue for non-standard contracts	18
3.6	Forecasting balancing and pass-through costs	20
3.7	Pricing for subsequent years	22
4	Consultation with stakeholders	23
4.1	Consultation on provisional prices	23
5	Final prices for GY2026	24
5.1	MPOC prices for GY2026	24
5.2	GTC prices for GY2026	25
Appendix 1:	Alignment with pricing principles	28
Appendix 2:	Regulatory compliance table	32
Appendix 3:	Director certificate	35

1 Overview of Firstgas' transmission system

Firstgas provides gas transmission services in the North Island of New Zealand, via a network of approximately 2,500 kilometres of pipeline.

1.1 Firstgas transmission system

The transmission system can be broadly described as a network of pipelines radiating from Taranaki and supplying multiple connection points along each pipeline's length (see Figure 1). A key feature of the gas transmission system is that many of the assets used to convey gas are used by multiple Shippers and many consumers.

The Maui gas transmission pipeline runs 299 kilometres from the Oaonui Production Station in South Taranaki to the Huntly Power Station in the North Island. It began operation in 1979 and was purchased by Firstgas in June 2016. The Maui Pipeline directly receives gas from Maui, Pohokura, McKee/Mangahewa, Turangi, and Kowhai gas fields and delivers gas to two major consumers, Huntly Power Station and the methanol facility at Motunui owned by Methanex, to distribution systems along its length, and to interconnection points with the non-Maui gas transmission system.

Firstgas also owns other gas transmission pipelines (referred to as the non-Maui gas transmission system) that are directly connected to the Maui pipeline at four interconnection points. This system was largely built between 1968 and the mid-1980s by the Natural Gas Corporation (NGC). It was purchased by Vector in 2005, and subsequently by Firstgas in April 2016. The non-Maui transmission system directly receives gas from the Kupe and Kapuni gas fields and delivers gas to about 130 Delivery Points (DPs) supplying distribution networks and large, directly connected gas consumers such as industrial plants and power stations.

1.2 Industry context for gas transmission pricing

The shared use of a substantial portion of assets has significant implications for the development of transmission prices. Transmission prices largely represent a recovery of common costs, rather than being directly attributable to the provision of a transmission service to a specific connection. Decisions must be made to determine appropriate cost allocation methods.

Shippers contract with Firstgas to transport their gas from sources of supply (Receipt Points) through the transmission system to Delivery Points. At present, there are 15 Shippers. Six of these Shippers operate as gas retailers, in the sense that they contract to ship gas for their customers. The other Shippers transport gas on their own behalf. A party becomes a Shipper by agreeing to the terms of a Transmission Services Agreement (TSA), on the Maui pipeline, non-Maui system or both.

Retailer shippers can repackage the transmission charges they pay, meaning that price signals do not necessarily reach the consumer directly. Gas transmission costs generally represent a small portion of the average consumer's gas bill, so any price signal at the transmission level tends to be muted by movements in wholesale gas costs, distribution charges and retail costs.

1.3 Regulatory environment for gas transmission

As the sole provider of gas transmission infrastructure, Firstgas is regulated by the Commerce Commission under Part 4 of the *Commerce Act 1986*. We are subject to:

- **Price-quality path regulation** that sets the prices we can charge and the level of service we must provide our customers
- **Information disclosure requirements** that require us to publish information about our financial and non-financial performance.

From 1 October 2022 to 30 September 2026, the gas transmission system is subject to the revenue cap specified in the *Gas Transmission Services Default Price-Quality Path Determination 2022* (PQ Determination). The allowable revenue that Firstgas can earn from providing gas transmission services is primarily derived from the value of regulated transmission assets and the allowable rate of return set by the Commerce Commission. Inputs for setting the PQ Determination need to comply with the definitions and approach set out in the Input Methodologies (IMs) developed by the Commerce Commission in 2010 and last amended in April 2024.

The *Gas Transmission Information Disclosure Determination 2012* (ID Determination) sets out several requirements around transmission pricing, including that we publish a transmission pricing methodology and explain the extent to which our prices comply with the Commission's pricing principles. The requirements are specified in clause 2.4 of the ID Determination, and our compliance with these requirements is summarised in **Appendices 1 and 2** of this Transmission Pricing Methodology (TPM).

The Maui Pipeline Operating Code (MPOC) and Gas Transmission Code (GTC) pricing methodologies are both presented in this document. This reflects the fact that the regulatory control under the current PQ Determination applies to the gas transmission business (GTB) as a whole (Maui and non-Maui), and we are required to demonstrate that our prices for GY2026 comply with the single revenue cap.

1.4 Approach to pricing methodologies for GY2026

For the pricing year commencing 1 October 2025, Firstgas has adjusted existing MPOC prices for the Maui transmission systems and GTC prices for the non-Maui gas transmission system to reflect changes in allowable revenue, forecast transmission quantities, and pass-through and recoverable costs.

The 2023 transmission pricing review conducted by Synergies Economic Consulting made a number of recommendations. One was for Firstgas to flatten the relationship between the distance that gas travels and the price that shippers pay. Synergies noted that geographic distance from Taranaki is not a significant driver of willingness to pay and that only limited price differentiation is required to ensure that floor and ceiling prices are met. Similarly, Synergies recommended a pricing structure that does not distinguish prices based on the geographical location of the receipt point, as a means of promoting the development of renewable gas supplies. Firstgas made some modifications to GTC pricing last year in response to these recommendations, and the GY26 pricing continues the trend of price flattening.

1.4.1 Capacity reservation fees

Previously, Firstgas adjusted capacity reservation fees (CRFs) using a uniform percentage increase. The effect was that the spread between the lowest and highest CRFs became ever larger. As a way of reducing this spread, last year, Firstgas increased all CRFs (except for Opotiki and Gisborne, addressed below) by a constant dollar amount. This meant that the proportionate price increase was higher for regions close to Taranaki and lower for more distant regions.

For GY26, Firstgas has again adjusted all CRFs by a constant dollar amount. The effect of this action is to narrow the range between the lowest CRF and the highest CRF, as recommended by Synergies.

1.4.2 Frankley Road fee

Last year, Firstgas eliminated the fee for inter-pipeline movements on the Frankley Road pipeline, consistent with Synergies' advice to move to pricing that does not distinguish prices based on the location of the receipt point. It also had the effect of making pricing on this pipeline easier to understand and simpler to administer. Firstgas will retain this change for GY2026.

1.4.3 Eastland CRFs

As part of its review, Synergies developed a detailed model that divided the transmission system into 18 modelling areas and assessed each to test compliance with the floor and ceiling price limits. That work highlighted that one of the areas, the eastern Bay of Plenty region comprising Opotiki and Gisborne, may not satisfy the floor price test. To address this issue, we have increased the CRFs at these two delivery points by an additional amount. This increase will continue to shift the region back to floor and ceiling price compliance.

1.4.4 Throughput fee

In previous years, shippers have told us that they would prefer a proportionately greater variable fee. Therefore, Firstgas has increased the throughput fee to increase the proportion of revenue recovered through variable fees.

1.4.5 Consultation with stakeholders

Firstgas released provisional prices on 30 May 2025 and invited feedback from stakeholders.

Two submissions were received.

One submission noted the effects of the price increases to their customer base. This submitter said that they would need to make sure that their customers understand the price impact and agree a strategy on integrating the new pricing.


The second submission noted that the proposed price increases are greater than inflation and described them as unsustainable. This submitter characterised revenue wash-up amount as being caused by declining throughput and said that Firstgas should not seek to use the wash-up mechanism to recover shortfalls in the following year. The submission also called for an estimated forward price trajectory through 2050.

Firstgas notes that the view on revenue wash-ups disregards the detailed reconciliation that we published with the provisional prices. In fact, a revenue shortfall can arise in two general ways: the first is through errors in forecasting demand, as the submitter described; the second is changes between the forecast allowable revenue and actual allowable revenue. Both factors contributed to the revenue wash-up for GY26. Firstgas considers the wash-up mechanism to be an important part of the regulatory regime, as it provides a timely means of correcting revenue under- and over-recovery.

Firstgas does not have a forward price trajectory, as future prices depend on Commerce Commission determinations for future regulatory periods.

No other points were raised in regard to the provisional prices.

Figure 1: Map of Firstgas transmission network



2 Overview of requirements

This section sets out the regulatory requirements that apply to pricing methodologies for gas transmission services.

2.1 Compliance with revenue cap for GTB

The GTB is required to set our prices to recover an amount no greater than the Forecast Allowable Revenue (FAR) under the current PQ Determination (2022 – 2026). Compliance with the FAR requirement is determined by ensuring the GY2026 prices multiplied by the forecast GY2026 quantities (the Target Revenue) is less than or equal to the FAR.

Target Revenue for GY2026 and our compliance with the FAR is set out in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Determining Target Revenue for GY2026 and compliance with the DPP

	Amount (\$)	Proportion of target revenue (%)
Forecast allowable revenue (FAR)		
Forecast Net Allowable Revenue	\$200,246,000	
Pass-through and recoverable costs	\$16,820,473	
Forecast Allowable Revenue GY2026	\$217,066,473	
Target Revenue		
Standard MPOC revenue	\$62,312,218	28.7%
Standard GTC revenue	\$146,469,483	67.5%
Non-standard pricing (SA and ICA revenue)	\$8,267,459	3.8%
Target Revenue GY2026	\$217,049,160	100.0%
Compliance (Target Revenue ≤ FAR)	Compliant	

Further detail on our compliance with the revenue cap can be found in our FY2026 *ex-ante* price setting compliance statement on our website.¹

Table 2 identifies the key components of target revenue required to cover the costs and return on investment associated with the Firstgas' provision of gas transmission services.

Table 2: Key components of target revenue

Cost component	Amount (\$)
Operational expenditure	\$72,517,000
Pass through and recoverable costs	\$12,220,473
Depreciation	\$62,015,530
Tax	\$14,134,197
Return on capital	\$56,161,960
Forecast Allowable Revenue	\$217,049,160

¹ <https://firstgas.co.nz/about-us/regulatory/transmission/> > Price-quality path compliance statements

2.2 Regulatory requirements for a pricing methodology disclosure

This pricing methodology is prepared in accordance with clause 2.4 of the ID Determination. Our compliance with these requirements is summarised in the compliance table provided in **Appendix 2**.

Firstgas is also required to demonstrate the extent to which the pricing methodology is consistent with the pricing principles, as defined in the applicable Input Methodologies.² In considering how prices should be set, we have applied those principles in the following way:

- Pricing for regions and delivery points should reflect the extent of assets required to provide the service. Therefore, prices at Delivery Points further from Receipt Points should generally be higher
- Shippers should pay more in locations where provision of capacity is more expensive, to signal the value of that capacity
- Pricing at the region and delivery point level should be consistent with existing prices under the GTC and MPOC to ensure that there are time-consistent incentives for gas usage in a particular region and that any tariff shock is minimised.

Further detail on our approach to aligning prices with the Pricing Principles is provided in **Appendix 1**.

² *Gas transmission services input methodologies determination 2012*, consolidating all amendments as of 3 April 2018, Commerce Commission.

3 Pricing methodology

For the year beginning 1 October 2025, we continue to apply the existing pricing structures for the Maui and Non-Maui transmission systems, as set out in the MPOC and the GTC.

As noted in section 2.1 above, our pricing methodology must ensure that prices set under the MPOC and GTC comply with the revenue cap under the PQ Determination. All revenue earned from the use of the gas transmission system – including both standard and non-standard transmission fees, and interconnection fees – are covered by the PQ Determination and included in the target revenue for GY2026.

3.1 Pricing under the MPOC

Standard Pricing for GY2026 continues to be based on Tariff 1 and Tariff 2. Non-standard prices are not allowed under the MPOC. The tariff principles set out in Schedule 10 of the MPOC state that:

- **Tariff 1** is intended to provide for a return on Maui pipeline assets. This tariff is expressed in \$/GJ.km.
- **Tariff 2** is intended to cover Maui operating costs, and is expressed in \$/GJ

GJ.km quantities have been estimated by

- Forecasting receipt quantities for each Receipt Point and delivery quantities for each offtake point on the Maui pipeline
- Multiplying the quantity for each Receipt Point and Delivery Point by their respective distances from Oaonui. This determines the GJ.km for all gas shipped into and out of the pipeline with reference to the southernmost Receipt Point (originally, the only Receipt Point)
- Deducting the sum of GJ.km for the Receipt Points from the sum of GJ.km for the Delivery Points to get the net sum of GJ.km for all gas shipped on the system.

Final prices under the MPOC must be published on OATIS by early August each year (60 days before the prices take effect). Pricing under the MPOC for GY2026 is discussed further in section 5.1, whilst Table 3 illustrates the close alignment between Schedule 10 of the MPOC and the allowable revenue under the PQ Determination.

Appendix 1 provides further information on how we have combined the requirements under the MPOC and the PQ Determination to meet the pricing principles specified by the Commerce Commission.

Table 3: Requirements under the MPOC reflect the PQ Determination

MPOC (Schedule 10)	Equivalent Approach under the PQ Determination
TSP will set the Transmission Charges in accordance with the standard practice adopted by utilities businesses in New Zealand. Accordingly, TSP will recover the cost and return of capital [and operating costs] as follows	The Commission sets allowable revenue for each year of a four-year regulatory period for our GTB³. Allowable revenue for the regulatory period is set on a building blocks basis that includes: • A WACC return on the regulatory asset base (RAB) • A return of capital based on the useful life of asset • An allowance for Operating Expenditure (Opex). Allowable revenue is specified in the PQ Determination.
Determine Tariff One	Determine Revenue for the GTB as a single system. Table 1 shows the expected revenue from prices under the MPOC.

³ Section 53M allows the Commerce Commission to set a default price-quality path for either 4 or 5 years. In 2022 the Commerce Commission set the price-quality path for the third regulatory period for 4 years (1 October 2022 – 30 September 2026)

MPOC (Schedule 10)		Equivalent Approach under the PQ Determination
(a)	Calculate the Maui Pipeline's Optimised Deprival Value or Optimised Depreciated Replacement Cost and multiply this value by a nominal WACC, and then subtract any revaluation gains/losses on the asset ("Required Return")	Allowable revenue for GY2026 is allocated to proposed Tariffs under the MPOC and GTC methodologies. Forecast revenue is the sum of tariffs multiplied with the associated forecast quantities. Tariffs are set such that forecast revenue for the GTB is less than allowable revenue. Tariff 1 recovers an amount of revenue reflective of the return on and return of capital for the Maui pipeline (refer section 5.1)
(b)	Calculate the return of capital based on the useful life of the asset ("Depreciation")	
(c)	Aggregate the Required Return and Depreciation to derive the "Required Revenue"	
(d)	Derive a GJ.km tariff ("Tariff 1")	
(e)	Apply Tariff 1 across the Maui Pipeline Shippers on the basis of quantity of Gigajoules of Gas transported multiplied by the distance of Gigajoules of Gas transported	Tariff 1 is applied across the Maui Pipeline Shippers on the basis of quantity of gas (measured in gigajoules) to be transported multiplied by the distance of gigajoules of Gas transported.
Determine Tariff Two:		Determine Revenue for the GTB as a single system. Table 1 shows the expected revenue from prices under the MPOC.
The approach adopted by TSP to recover operating expenditure is to:		As with Tariff 1 above, an allowance for Opex is included in the allowable revenue set by the Commission. Firstgas ensures that forecast revenue for the GTB is less than allowable revenue.
(a)	Aggregate the Maui pipeline's operating costs (Opex)	Tariff 2 is applied across Maui Pipeline Shippers on the basis of Gigajoules of gas delivered from the Maui system. Tariff 2 recovers an amount of revenue reflective of the operational expenditure of the Maui pipeline (refer section 5.1)
(b)	Allocate operational expenditure across every gigajoule of gas delivered from the Maui Pipeline.	
Reduce price volatility		
In any given year, in the event that the: - TSP's total revenues are more or less than its required revenue then Tariff 1 - TSP's total Operational Expenditure recovery is more or less than its required recovery then Tariff 2 the respective tariffs may be adjusted for the following years in a manner that endeavours to reduce pricing volatility for Shippers.		As noted in section 2.2 above, when setting prices, we maintain consistency with existing prices as much as possible to ensure that any tariff shock is minimised.

3.2 Pricing under the GTC

The GTC allows for non-standard contracts and pricing as described in section 3.5 below. Revenue and prices are determined for non-standard contracts first so standard prices can be set. This reflects non-standard prices being either ongoing and/or individually negotiated.

GTC standard capacity reservation fees are set on a regional basis. A pricing region may include one or more Transmission Zones⁴. Table 4 lists transmission pricing regions for GY2025 and the Delivery Points which fall within each pricing region.

⁴ A Transmission Zone is a group of Delivery Points for which a Shipper's reserved capacity is "pooled".

Table 4: Aggregation of Delivery Points into pricing regions

GY2026 Pricing Regions		Delivery points
1	Auckland	Tuakau 2, Harrisville 2, Ramarama , Drury 1, Drury 2, Pukekohe, Kingseat, Glenbrook, Waiuku, Greater Auckland, Hunua, Hunua (Nova), Hunua 3, Alfriston, Flat Bush (Nova), Waitoki
2	Northland	Warkworth, Wellsford, Marsden 2, Whangarei, Kauri DF, Maungaturoto DF
3	Waikato North	Horotiu, Matangi, Cambridge, Kiwitahi No.1 (Peroxide), Kiwitahi No.2, Morrinsville Dairy Factory, Morrinsville, Tatuani DF, Waitoa, Greater Hamilton, Te Rapa Cogen
4	South Taranaki - Whanganui	Mokoia, Waverley, Matapu, Manaia, Hawera, Hawera (Nova), Patea, Waitotara, Wanganui, Kaitoke, Lake Alice, Kakariki, Marton
5	Manawatu - Horowhenua	Flockhouse, Oroua Downs, Longburn, Kairanga, Palmerston North, Feilding, Ashhurst, Foxton, Levin, Kuku, Mangatainoka, Pahiatua, Pahiatua DF
6	Hawkes Bay	Dannevirke, Takapau, Mangaroa, Hastings, Hastings (Nova)
7	Wellington	Otaki, Te Horo, Greater Kapiti, Pauatahanui 2, Greater Waitangirua, Belmont, Tawa A, Tawa B (Nova)
8	Inland Taranaki	Eltham, Kaponga, Stratford, Inglewood, Waitara, New Plymouth
9	Waikato South	Lichfield Dairy Factory, Lichfield 2, Kinleith (CHH mill), Waikeria, Tokoroa, Kinleith, Putaruru, Tirau Dairy Factory, Tirau, Okoroire Springs, Greater Kihikihi
10	Tauranga	Greater Tauranga, Greater Mt Maunganui, Tauriko, Te Puke , Rangioru
11	Central Plateau	Kawerau (Caxton mill), Kawerau (Tasman mill), Reporoa, Reporoa DF, Broadlands, Taupo, Rotorua, Kawerau
12	Whakatane	Edgecumbe Dairy Factory, Whakatane, Te Teko, Edgecumbe
13	Eastland	Opotiki, Gisborne
14	Coastal Taranaki	Opunake, Pungarehu No 1, Pungarehu No 2, Okato, Oakura
15	King Country	Pirongia, Te Awamutu DF, Te Kuiti South, Te Kuiti North, Otorohanga, Ngaruawahia, Huntly
16	Frankley Road	Kapuni (Lactose et al), Kaimiro Delivery, KGTP delivery, Kupe Delivery Point, Ballance 8201, Ballance 9626, Stratford 3-Delivery Point, Stratford 2, TCC Power Station

3.2.1 Standard price setting for the GTC

Standard Price means any price that is published as part of the Confirmed Standard Transmission Fees Schedule published on OATIS.⁵ Standard Prices include the prices for the Frankley Road pipeline.

Further information on pricing for GY2026 is in section 5.2.

GTC revenue by standard price component

Standard revenue under the GTC comes from throughput fees (TPF), capacity reservation fees (CRF) and overrun fees. Around 62% of GTC standard revenue comes from CRFs and a further 31% from TPFs.

- **CRFs** are applied to the annual Capacity (GJ) reservations at a DP (or in respect of a Transmission Zone) and represent a transmission right in terms of maximum daily quantity (MDQ). CRFs are based on the assets employed between the relevant Receipt Point and DP. Capacity reservations

⁵ <https://www.oatis.co.nz/Ngc.Oatis.Ul.Web.Internet/Common/Publications.aspx> > Firstgas VTC Information Exchange > Publications > Transmission Fees

are provided by shippers in September prior to the beginning of each gas year. A Shipper may transfer reserved capacity between Delivery Points or pipelines or trade it with another Shipper. A Shipper may cancel reserved capacity within a year only to the extent that another Shipper has booked additional reserved capacity within that year.

Final capacity reservations are not known at the time of finalising the TPM and setting confirmed prices for a year, so it is necessary to forecast capacity reservations based on historical gas flows and observed booking patterns to determine revenue recovered by this fee.

- The **TPF**⁶ is applied to the GJ delivered. It is necessary to forecast throughput quantities to determine revenue recovered by this fee.
- **Overrun fees**⁷ are forecast as a percentage of total revenue for each pricing zone. This is because the choice shippers make on the level of overruns they plan to incur is an economic decision, based on trading off savings in capacity reservation charges on the one hand against overrun charges on the other. The percentage of overrun charges relative to throughput and capacity charges for each pricing zone is generally taken to be the average for the previous three years.

Under the GTC, final prices (CRFs and the TPF) must be notified to customers by 1 September each year.

3.3 Determining the Target Revenue for the GTB

To show how we determine our target revenue each pricing year, Table 5 sets out the components that factor into our pricing methodology and prices for the GTB. The overall pricing methodology and pricing of transmission services by Firstgas brings together pricing under the MPOC and GTC.

Table 5: Components for inclusion in pricing methodology

Forecast Revenue from Prices	≤	Forecast Allowable Revenue
This equals the: - Sum of each standard price under the MPOC multiplied by each corresponding forecast quantity for the Maui transmission network + Sum of each standard price under the GTC multiplied by each corresponding forecast quantity for the Non-Maui transmission network + Non-Standard Pricing including ICA revenue and SA revenue This is our Target Revenue for the pricing year.		This equals the: - Forecast net allowable revenue + Forecast pass-through and recoverable costs that includes: • Rates and levies • Balancing gas costs and revenues • Mokau compressor fuel gas costs • Capex Wash-up adjustment + Opening balance of the wash-up account This is our Forecast Allowable Revenue for the pricing year.

⁶ Historically, the same TPF has been applied to all Delivery Points other than those on the Frankley Road pipeline.

⁷ Overrun fees are an incentive fee to encourage reasonable capacity booking. The standard overrun fee is ten times the CRF calculated on a daily basis and applied to GJ delivered in excessive of reserved capacity.

Our Transmission Pricing Model calculates the Target Revenue while ensuring that the Forecast Allowable Revenue is not exceeded. This is an iterative process, covering the following steps:

1. We calculate the Forecast Allowable Revenue, following the methodology set out in the PQ Determination. This is considered the total allowable revenue
2. We calculate revenue from non-standard Supplementary Agreements (SAs) and Interconnection Agreements (ICAs) as shown in the table below. This is estimated using throughput forecasts together with any changes to capacity and/or prices in accordance with the agreements
3. The forecast revenue from SAs and ICAs is deducted from the total allowable revenue to establish the required standard revenue for transmission services
4. The Target Revenue is calculated.

The table below shows this process and that the calculated Target Revenue complies with the Forecast Allowable Revenue.

Table 6: Target revenue compliance with forecast allowable revenue

Revenue component	Amount	
Forecast Allowable Revenue (A)	\$217,066,473	
Target Revenue (\$)		Proportion of Target Revenue (%)
Non-Standard Pricing		
• GTC ICA Revenue (B)	\$1,301,712	0.6%
• GTC SA Revenue (C)	\$6,965,747	3.2%
Standard Pricing		
• MPOC standard revenue (D)	\$62,312,218	28.7%
• GTC standard revenue (E)	\$146,469,483	67.5%
Target Revenue (F = B + C +D+E)	\$217,049,160	100.0%
Difference (A – F)	17,313	
Compliant?	YES	

3.4 Transmission pricing assumptions

3.4.1 Forecast gas flows

Each year Firstgas is required to forecast throughput for the coming year starting 1 October. Our forecast is based on a third- party forecast of gas flows across the network (completed by Areté Consulting Limited), peer reviewed by Firstgas staff. The resulting outcome reflects both statistical methods as well as market intelligence such as expected changes to existing loads and production volumes.

Forecast throughput at Delivery Points includes delivered quantities under both standard and non-standard contracts.

3.4.2 Forecast capacity reservations

Firstgas has projected capacity reservations based on historical trends and the observed relationship between historical gas flows and capacity bookings. Shippers generally reserve less capacity than their annual peak MDQ, to optimise capacity reservation fees versus overrun charges. One GJ of reserved capacity attracts 365 days of charges, whereas one GJ of overrun is charged the equivalent of 10 days of charges. Shippers will also take advantage of seasonal and counter-cyclical demand if they can and shift

reserved capacity to minimise their overall capacity bookings. Shippers tend to book capacity at a level that represents about the 37th highest day in the previous gas year. Capacity reservation forecasts are also informed by Shippers' provisional capacity requests.

3.4.3 Interconnection agreements

Interconnection fees are charged in circumstances where Firstgas has built or upgraded a delivery point or other transmission infrastructure to enable the connection. An interconnection agreement (ICA) allows a party to physically connect to a (non-Maui) pipeline to either inject gas (Receipt Point) or take gas (Delivery Point). ICAs are not part of the GTC, although they reference several GTC provisions.

Fees are as specified in the ICA and are subject to the Firstgas Interconnection Policy. Interconnection fees are a daily or sometimes monthly charge to recover the cost of the connection.

3.5 Approach to prices and revenue for non-standard contracts

In certain circumstances, the published standard prices may not adequately:

- reflect the actual costs of supplying a consumer or the economic value of the service to the consumer
- reflect the commercial risks associated with supplying that consumer
- recognise the consumer's circumstances (including the availability of an alternative fuel).

In such cases, non-standard contracts may be more appropriate for customers.

3.5.1 Extent of non-standard contracts

In addition to standard published prices, our transmission pricing methodology also covers the following non-standard transmission agreements:

- **Supplementary Agreement (SA):** A bi-lateral agreement between Firstgas and a Shipper that amends parts of the GTC and provides firm transmission capacity for the purposes of delivery of gas to a specific DP and consumer
- **Interruptible User Contract (IUC):** A form of supplementary agreement that allows the Shipper to request a maximum daily quantity (MDQ) on an interruptible basis to supply a specific consumer
- **Interruptible Shipper Contract (ISC):** A form of supplementary agreement that allows the Shipper to request an MDQ on an interruptible basis. Capacity approved by Firstgas may be used only to ship gas from one part of the non-Maui pipeline to another, or between non-Maui pipelines.

These contracts apply only to the non-Maui transmission system.⁸ Non-standard contracts are not allowed under the MPOC.

Under a SA, IUC or ISC, the Shipper is charged the non-standard transmission fees specified in the agreement. Such non-standard agreements are subject to the Firstgas Supplementary Agreements Policy⁹.

Prices in non-standard contracts are redetermined annually during their term as specified in each contract.

⁸ Further information on our non-standard contracts is available on the Firstgas website. <https://firstgas.co.nz/about-us/regulatory-information/transmission> > Contract disclosures

⁹ <https://www.oatis.co.nz/Ngc/Oatis.Ul.Web.Internet/Common/Publications.aspx> > Firstgas VTC Information Exchange > Publications > Supplementary Agreements

3.5.2 Criteria for non-standard contracts

Any Shipper on the non-Maui transmission system may request a Supplementary Agreement if it believes that the standard provisions of the GTC are not appropriate in relation to the transmission (or potential transmission) of its Gas for supply to a specific end-user or site.

Information on factors to be considered when deciding whether or not to offer a non-standard contract on the transmission system is available under the *Supplementary Agreements Policy* (2024) available on OATIS.

3.5.3 Methodology for non-standard prices

The prices in each non-standard contract are set to reflect the circumstances of the specific Shipper/end-user (or interconnected party, in the case of an ICA). In all cases, prices are tested to ensure they are neither less than incremental cost of supply nor greater than standalone costs.

When a non-standard contract is due for renewal, pricing is re-assessed to determine whether circumstances still justify non-standard prices and (where relevant) the extent of any discount on standard prices. The flexible approach to pricing for non-standard contracts achieves greater alignment with the Pricing Principles, as demonstrated in **Appendix 1**.

3.5.4 Obligations around service interruptions

The ID Determination¹⁰ requires Firstgas to describe our obligations and responsibilities (if any) to consumers subject to non-standard contracts, if the supply of gas transmission services to the consumer is interrupted.

Our obligations for the provision of transmission capacity under (standard) TSAs and SAs (excluding interruptible agreements) are comparable.

Reserved capacity provided under Shippers' TSAs ranks equally with firm capacity provided under SAs (supplementary capacity) in the event of an emergency or other event affecting the relevant part(s) of the transmission system.

The GTC requires Firstgas to use all reasonable endeavours to curtail consumers on interruptible agreements before restricting Shippers' reserved capacity or supplementary capacity.

The main difference between firm transmission capacity and interruptible capacity is the probability of curtailment. Firm capacity may only be curtailed as the result of an emergency (unless the Shipper is in overrun), whereas interruptible capacity may be interrupted at any time.

A Shipper whose firm capacity is curtailed will normally be entitled to a rebate of the fixed transmission fees.

A Shipper using interruptible capacity will not be charged to the extent of the interruption.

¹⁰ Clause 2.4.5(2) of the ID Determination.

3.6 Forecasting balancing and pass-through costs

As explained in section 2.1 (above), Forecast Allowable Revenue includes amounts defined in the Input Methodologies as pass-through and recoverable costs. Five different types of such costs are aggregated when setting transmission prices for a year. These are specified in section 3.1.2 or 3.1.3 of the Input Methodologies and summarised in the sections below.

Table 7: Forecast values for rates and levies for GY2026

Pass-through cost	Amount
Rates and levies	\$2,865,834
Balancing gas costs and revenues	\$2,900,000
Mokau fuel gas	\$1,700,000
Capex wash-up adjustment	\$1,694,661
Opening balance of wash-up account (revenue cap mechanism)	\$7,659,978
Total pass through and recoverable costs	\$16,820,473

3.6.1 Rates and levies

The following costs are included in this category:

- **Property rates** from GY2025 were used as a basis. It has been assumed that there will be an increase in property rates largely in line with an inflation adjustment (CPI).
- **Commerce Act levies** are similar to GY2025 and reflect the Commerce Commission's forecast for its 'bridging the gap' levy funding.¹¹
- **Utilities Disputes** are determined annually as prescribed by the scheme rules. The levies do not significantly change year on year. For GY2026 it is assumed the levies will remain the same as those charged in April 2025.

The forecast values for GY2026 are shown in Table 8.

Table 8: Forecast values for rates and levies

Pass-through cost	Amount
Rates	\$1,605,000
Commerce Commission levies	\$1,219,731
Utility Disputes Limited Levies	\$41,103
Total	\$2,865,834

3.6.2 Balancing gas costs and revenues

Balancing gas costs were projected based on historical costs of balancing transactions as well as the net cost of cash outs. Balancing is inherently volatile, and monthly balancing costs in the past two years have ranged between positive \$3390K and negative \$860K. Firstgas has sought to strike a balance in estimating these costs by excluding outlier months and projecting the coming year's costs based on the remaining data points.

Firstgas notes the degree of uncertainty around forecasts for balancing gas costs and revenues, driven by these volume-related factors:

¹¹ https://comcom.govt.nz/_data/assets/pdf_file/0024/229830/Part-4-energy-levy-funding-consultation-paper-10-Dec-2020.pdf

- It is impossible to exactly anticipate how much gas will need to be transacted (either buying or selling) to keep the system in balance.
- We do not know the prices that will apply to those balancing gas transactions, since pricing is very responsive to market dynamics at the time the transactions (each an operational response) occur.

3.6.3 Mokau compressor fuel gas costs

Mokau compression is treated as a recoverable cost under the Input Methodologies. Mokau fuel gas costs were calculated with reference to required volumes in previous years. We have estimated the average cost of fuel gas by taking the midpoint of the implied forward price range for gas and adjusting based on the relationship between historical fuel gas transactions and market average price. The resulting forecast cost is **\$1,700,000**.

3.6.4 Capex wash-up adjustment

The Capex wash-up adjustment is a recoverable cost that can be added to prices for years 2 – 4 of the DPP3 period to reflect “the difference between the revenues for a DPP regulatory period using the actual values of commissioned assets for a prior regulatory period, and the revenues using forecast commissioned assets applied by the Commission when setting prices”.

The intent of the Capex wash-up adjustment is to ensure regulated businesses are in approximately the same position (in terms of allowable revenue), had the actual opening Regulated Asset Base been known when revenue for the DPP period were reset.

GY2026 is the fourth year of the DPP3 regulatory period. As such, the value for GY2026 is **\$1,694,661**.

3.6.5 Revenue cap wash-up

The revenue cap wash-up amount is calculated and published as part of Firstgas' PQ Compliance Statement.¹² A time value of money adjustment as prescribed in the PQ Determination is applied to the calculated raw amount. The value of the revenue cap wash-up for GY2026 is **\$7,659,978**.

¹² First Gas' compliance statements for our gas transmission business are available on our website here: <https://firstgas.co.nz/about-us/regulatory/transmission/>.

3.7 Pricing for subsequent years

3.7.1 Loss of a significant load

The future impact on prices of losing a major load varies depending on the location of the load on the system. For example, the loss of a load on the Maui pipeline will have a much lower pricing impact than the loss of the same size load in (for example) Northland. This simply reflects the difference in assets employed and the higher prices prevailing even before the load was lost.

We face at least two options when a large load is lost:

- Confine revenue collection to the region in which the load was lost, and increase prices only there to compensate; or
- Spread the lost revenue over the entire system.

In the first case, Firstgas would be required to collect the same revenue from a smaller volume of load in the same zone. The remaining load might not be able to support the resulting increase in prices (consumers might disconnect). It could also create undesirable price differences between adjacent regions.


In the second case, spreading the loss over the system could have the effect of some transmission customers bearing costs for assets that they do not use.

Therefore, a degree of judgement is required in determining how to adjust prices in such situations. An important factor to consider is how the previous revenue was shared before the load was lost.

3.7.2 Alignment with cost reflective prices

Firstgas engaged Synergies Consulting to assist us with a review of pricing methodology, including an analysis of incremental and standalone costs. The results of that assessment are shown in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: Analysis of floor and ceiling limits



Synergies grouped delivery points into 19 geographical regions, termed “floor and ceiling assessment regions” or FCARs. The ceiling price is assessed based on the standalone cost of providing the transmission service to any feasible combination of customers (the “combinatorial” standalone test). The ceiling prices are represented by purple markers in the chart above. The relevant comparison revenue is the revenue from delivery points within the target FCAR as well as other FCARS that the gas traverses to reach

that FCAR. These amounts are shown by the combined green and grey bars. All regions satisfy the ceiling test.

The floor price is based on the avoidable cost of providing the service, including incremental operating costs and any incremental investment required to meet the customer's requirements. Floor prices are represented by red markers in the chart above. The comparison revenue is all revenue derived from delivery points within the FCAR, shown by the green bars only. As Synergies identified, all FCARs satisfy the floor test, with the exception of the Gisborne area on the Bay of Plenty pipeline. It is for this reason that the capacity reservation fees for Opotiki and Gisborne have been increased by a greater amount than the rest of the delivery points, as a way of beginning to shift the region back to floor and ceiling price compliance.

4 Consultation with stakeholders

Consultation this year has focused on the pricing methodologies that will apply for GY2026 including:

- The calculation of Maui tariffs
- Adjustments to capacity reservation fees
- The additional increase to Gisborne and Opotiki delivery points.

4.1 Consultation on provisional prices

We provided a 9-page letter to customers and stakeholders on 30 May 2025 outlining the proposed price increases and information on the proposed structure of pricing. A copy of the letter is available on OATIS.

Firstgas received correspondence from two interested stakeholders. After reviewing the feedback, we consider our approach for GY2026 pricing is appropriate.

5 Final prices for GY2026

This section sets out the final standard prices for GY2026 that have been determined under the MPOC and GTC.

The revenue earned from transmission services provided under the MPOC and GTC has been updated to reflect changes in allowable revenue, forecast transmission quantities, and pass-through and recoverable costs. The proportion of target revenue that we forecast will be collected through each contract for GY2026 is summarised in Table 10 below.

Table 10: Proportion of target revenue by price component for GY2026

	Amount (\$)	Proportion of target revenue (%)
Standard MPOC revenue		
Tariff 1	\$45,606,816	21.0%
Tariff 2	\$16,705,403	7.7%
Standard Target revenue under MPOC	\$62,312,218	28.7%
Standard GTC revenue		
Capacity Reservation Fees (CRF)	\$96,323,983	44.4%
Throughput Fees (TPF)	\$48,362,412	22.3%
Over-run Fees	\$1,783,088	0.8%
Target standard GTC revenue	\$146,469,483	67.5%
Total standard target revenue	\$208,781,701	96.2%
Non-standard GTC target revenue	\$8,267,459	3.8%
Total target revenue	\$217,049,160	100.0%

The change in standard prices for GY2026 under the MPOC and GTC are outlined below.

5.1 MPOC prices for GY2026

MPOC pricing for GY2026 has increased due to the increase in forecast allowable revenue this year, the proportion of revenue washup attributable to Maui, and the projected decrease in throughput volume.

MPOC pricing for GY2026 is set out in Table 11 below.

Table 11: GY2026 MPOC prices

Tariff	Unit	GY2025	GY2026	Percentage change
Tariff 1	\$ / GJ.km	0.003594	0.004295	19.5%
Tariff 2	\$ / GJ	0.170834	0.206026	20.6%

5.2 GTC prices for GY2026

Standard pricing for GY2026 maintains the pricing structure of previous years. As with the Maui prices, increases are due to the increase in forecast allowable revenue, revenue washup, and decrease in projected gas volumes.

Specific actions for GY2026 pricing year include:

- An increase of \$77 per GJ of reserved capacity per year for most delivery points
- An increase of \$87 per GJ of reserved capacity per year for the delivery points of Gisborne and Opotiki, to continue bringing the Eastland region into ceiling and floor compliance
- An increase of 27% to the GTC throughput fee, to \$1.22 per GJ for deliveries not on the Frankley Road pipeline
- An increase of 25% to the Frankley Road throughput fee, to \$0.50 per GJ.
- Table 12 summarises the changes in price between GY2025 and GY2026 and Table 13 summarises the standard revenue by pricing region under the GTC for GY2026.

Table 12: GY2026 GTC standard prices

Pricing region	GY2025		GY2026		Percentage change	
	TPF	CRF	TPF	CRF	TPF	CRF
	\$/GJ	\$/GJ.MDQ	\$/GJ	\$/GJ.MDQ	%	%
Auckland	\$0.96	\$559	\$1.22	\$636	27.1%	13.8%
Northland	\$0.96	\$821	\$1.22	\$898	27.1%	9.4%
Waikato North	\$0.96	\$574	\$1.22	\$651	27.1%	13.4%
South Taranaki - Whanganui	\$0.96	\$545	\$1.22	\$622	27.1%	14.1%
Manawatu - Horowhenua	\$0.96	\$559	\$1.22	\$636	27.1%	13.8%
Hawkes Bay	\$0.96	\$574	\$1.22	\$651	27.1%	13.4%
Wellington	\$0.96	\$679	\$1.22	\$756	27.1%	11.3%
Inland Taranaki	\$0.96	\$173	\$1.22	\$250	27.1%	44.5%
Waikato South	\$0.96	\$574	\$1.22	\$651	27.1%	13.4%
Tauranga	\$0.96	\$693	\$1.22	\$770	27.1%	11.1%
Central Plateau	\$0.96	\$722	\$1.22	\$799	27.1%	10.7%
Whakatane	\$0.96	\$752	\$1.22	\$829	27.1%	10.2%
Eastland	\$0.96	\$800	\$1.22	\$887	27.1%	10.9%
Coastal Taranaki	\$0.96	\$173	\$1.22	\$250	27.1%	44.5%
King Country	\$0.96	\$574	\$1.22	\$651	27.1%	13.4%
Frankley Road	\$0.40	n/a	\$0.50	n/a	25.0%	n/a

Table 13: GY2026 GTC standard forecast revenue

	Prices		Quantities	Revenue (\$)			Total Revenue
Pricing Region	TPF (\$/GJ)	CRF (\$/GJ.MDQ)	Throughput	TPF	CRF	Over-Run	
Auckland	\$1.22	\$636	12,421,079	\$15,153,716	\$32,774,856	\$15,067	\$47,943,638
Northland	\$1.22	\$898	140,924	\$171,927	\$472,396	\$16,693	\$661,016
Waikato North	\$1.22	\$651	5,200,233	\$6,344,284	\$13,004,900	\$355,772	\$19,704,956
South Taranaki - Whanganui	\$1.22	\$622	1,524,480	\$1,859,866	\$3,655,207	\$198,094	\$5,713,167
Manawatu - Horowhenua	\$1.22	\$636	1,923,446	\$2,346,604	\$5,413,596	\$56,886	\$7,817,087
Hawkes Bay	\$1.22	\$651	2,005,894	\$2,447,191	\$4,964,800	\$230,537	\$7,642,528
Wellington	\$1.22	\$756	3,677,334	\$4,486,347	\$11,727,066	\$69,463	\$16,282,876
Inland Taranaki	\$1.22	\$250	1,051,419	\$1,282,731	\$897,794	\$27,550	\$2,208,075
Waikato South	\$1.22	\$651	2,766,956	\$3,375,686	\$9,202,869	\$251,571	\$12,830,127
Tauranga	\$1.22	\$770	1,451,457	\$1,770,778	\$4,308,988	\$89,343	\$6,169,109
Central Plateau	\$1.22	\$799	1,343,262	\$1,638,780	\$4,312,778	\$214,885	\$6,166,443
Whakatane	\$1.22	\$829	807,214	\$984,801	\$2,786,301	\$51,921	\$3,823,024
Eastland	\$1.22	\$887	240,783	\$293,755	\$865,722	\$34,784	\$1,194,261
Coastal Taranaki	\$1.22	\$250	18,498	\$22,568	\$20,753	\$2,018	\$45,339
King Country	\$1.22	\$651	731,498	\$892,428	\$1,915,957	\$168,503	\$2,976,887
Frankley Road	\$0.50	n/a	10,581,900	\$5,290,950	n/a	n/a	\$5,290,950
Total Standard Revenue (GTC)				\$48,362,412	\$96,323,983	\$1,783,088	\$146,469,483

Appendix 1: Alignment with pricing principles

Regulatory requirement

The ID Determination states that Firstgas must:

- 2.4.3(2) *Demonstrate the extent to which the pricing methodology is consistent with the **pricing principles** and explain the reasons for any inconsistency between the pricing methodology and the **pricing principles**;*

Consistency with Pricing Principles

The Commerce Commission has determined pricing principles for regulated gas pipeline businesses. Our evaluation of the consistency between Firstgas' TPM based on the MPOC and GTC pricing methodologies, and the pricing principles is set out in Tables A (standard pricing) and B (non-standard pricing) below. Non-standard pricing applies to the GTC only.

Table A: Compliance of standard pricing with the Pricing Principles

Pricing principles	Pricing methodology consistency	
	MPOC	GTC
(1) Prices are to signal the economic costs of service provision, by (a) being subsidy free, that is, equal to or greater than incremental costs and less than or equal to standalone costs, except where subsidies arise from compliance with legislation and/or other regulation; (b) having regard, to the extent practicable, to the level of available service capacity; and (c) signalling, to the extent practicable, the effect of additional usage on future investment costs.	MPOC pricing is partially consistent with this principle: • Prices are subsidy-free • Economic costs of service provision have been considered • There are no capacity constraints currently on the network to be reflected in current pricing • There is no ability in MPOC to signal future investment costs	Pricing under the GTC is partially consistent with this principle. Prices are subsidy-free, with the exception of the Eastland region, which is being addressed. There are no capacity constraints currently on the network to be reflected in current pricing. The ability to signal available capacity and the effect of additional usage on future investment costs is driven as much by the access products offered under the code as the way those products are priced..
(2) Where prices based on 'efficient' incremental costs would under-recover allowed revenues, the shortfall is made up by prices being set in a manner that has regard to consumers' demand responsiveness, to the extent practicable.	The TPM is the same for all our consumers and does not consider demand responsiveness, as per the terms of the MPOC.	The TPM is not fully consistent with this principle. As with principle 1, the terms of the transmission access code have a material impact on consistency with this principle. Pricing in this TPM is based on location and the pricing structure, consistent with the GTC and previous versions of the TPM. In the case of the GTC, the ability to offer non-standard pricing provides the ability to directly respond to individual circumstances, so as to retain load that might otherwise be lost, with detrimental impact for remaining consumers' prices.

Pricing principles	Pricing methodology consistency	
	MPOC	GTC
(3) Provided that prices satisfy (1) above, prices are responsive to the requirements and circumstances of consumers in order to- (a) discourage uneconomic bypass; and (b) allow negotiation to better reflect the economic value of services and enable consumers to make price/quality trade-offs or non-standard arrangements for services.	The TPM does not satisfy principle (1). Uneconomic bypass is not possible in most cases. Where bypass or alternative fuels are an economic option, the customer cannot apply for non-standard prices under the terms of the MPOC.	Where bypass or alternative fuels are an economic option, the customer can apply for non-standard prices under the GTC.
(4) Development of prices is transparent, promotes price stability and certainty for consumers, and changes to prices have regard to the effect on consumers.	We believe development of our prices is transparent and the TPM promotes price stability and certainty for our consumers in the short to medium term.	We believe development of our prices is transparent and the TPM promotes price stability and certainty for our consumers in the short to medium term.

Table B: Compliance of non-standard pricing under the GTC with the Pricing Principles

This table shows how the use of non-standard pricing can allow us to better comply with the pricing principles. We have compared compliance with the principles without non-standard pricing and then with non-standard pricing.

Pricing principle	Extent of compliance without non-standard pricing	Extent of compliance with non-standard pricing
1) Prices are to signal the economic costs of service provision, by a) being subsidy free, that is, equal to or greater than incremental costs and less than or equal to standalone costs, except where subsidies arise from compliance with legislation and/or other regulation; b) having regard, to the extent practicable, to the level of available service capacity; and c) signaling to the extent practicable, the effect of additional usage	Prices are subsidy-free There are no capacity constraints currently on the network to be reflected in current pricing. Price structure is set to generally encourage use of spare capacity.	Prices remain subsidy-free Compliance is enhanced because non-standard pricing ensures that consumers that would otherwise disconnect from the gas transmission system will remain connected and use available capacity that would otherwise be unutilised. These consumers will continue to pay some portion of the shared costs of the gas transmission system at least equal to or above incremental costs - providing a benefit to all connected parties
2) Where prices based on 'efficient' incremental costs would under recover allowed revenues, the shortfall is made up by prices being set in a manner that has regard to consumers' demand responsiveness, to the extent practicable.	If a consumer disconnects because standard prices exceeded their "reservation cost" then those prices did not reflect the demand-responsiveness of that consumer.	Compliance is enhanced because the demand-responsiveness of a price-sensitive consumer has been taken into account by the nonstandard pricing.
3) Provided that prices satisfy (1) above, prices are responsive to the requirements and circumstances of consumers in order to: a) discourage uneconomic bypass; and b) allow negotiation to better reflect the economic value of services and enable consumers to make price/quality trade-offs or nonstandard arrangements for services.	All prices are subsidy-free so meet (1) above. Prices have been explicitly set to account for the cost of alternative sources of energy for the average consumer in a category, but do not account for the specific circumstances of all consumers.	Prices continue to be subsidy-free so meet (1) above. Compliance is enhanced because non-standard pricing allows differential prices to be set for the specific consumers where bypass is viable or would otherwise be uneconomic. Compliance is enhanced because non-standard pricing allows prices for gas transmission services to be customised to reflect the economic value of gas transmission services to specific consumers. This allows the consumer to make quality/price trade-offs.
4) Development of prices is transparent, promotes price stability and certainty for consumers, and changes to prices have regard to the effect on consumers	We believe development of our prices is transparent and the TPM promotes price stability and certainty for our consumers in the short to medium term.	Compliance is enhanced because allowance can be made for the effect on consumers whose circumstances make them particularly sensitive to prices.

Appendix 2: Regulatory compliance table

Table C demonstrates how this pricing methodology complies with the requirements set in the *Gas Transmission Information Disclosure Determination 2012*.

Table C: Compliance matrix

Principle	Reference / description	
	Pricing methodology for MPOC	Pricing methodology for GTC
2.4.1 Every GTB must publicly disclose , before the start of each pricing year , a pricing methodology which-	The pricing methodology will be publicly disclosed by 30 September 2025. See individual clauses below	
(1) Describes the methodology, in accordance with clause 2.4.3, used to calculate the prices payable or to be payable;	Section 3.1	Section 3.2
(2) Describes any changes in prices and target revenues ;	Section 3.3 explains how target revenues are determined and section 5 describes changes in prices and target revenues	Section 3.3 explains how target revenues are determined and section 5 describes changes in prices and target revenues
(3) Explains, in accordance with clause 2.4.5 of this section, the approach taken with respect to pricing in non-standard contracts ; and	Not applicable. Non-standard contracts are not available under the MPOC	Section 3.5
(4) Explains whether, and if so how, the GTB has sought the views of consumers , their expectations in terms of price and quality, and reflected those views in calculating the prices payable or to be payable. If the GTB has not sought the views of consumers , the reasons for not doing so must be disclosed.	Section 4 and 1.4.5	Section 4 and 1.4.5
2.4.2 Any change in the pricing methodology or adoption of a different pricing methodology, must be publicly disclosed at least 20 working days before prices determined in accordance with the change or the different pricing methodology take effect.	The pricing methodology for GY2026 continues to be based on the MPOC and GTC. Our pricing methodology will be publicly disclosed by 30 September 2025.	
2.4.3 Every disclosure under clause 2.4.1 of this section must-	See individual clauses below	
2.4.3(1) Include sufficient information and commentary for interested persons to understand how prices were set for consumers , including the assumptions and statistics used to determine prices for consumers ;	Sections 3 and 5.1.	Sections 3 and 5.2.
2.4.3(2) Demonstrate the extent to which the pricing methodology is consistent with the Pricing Principles and explain the reasons for any inconsistency between the pricing methodology and the Pricing Principles ;	Appendix 1.	Appendix 1.
2.4.3(3) State the target revenue expected to be collected for the pricing year to which the pricing methodology applies;	Section 3.3	Section 3.3

Principle	Reference / description	
	Pricing methodology for MPOC	Pricing methodology for GTC
2.4.3(4) Where applicable, Identify the key components of target revenue required to cover the costs and return on investment associated with the GTB's provision of gas transmission services. Disclosure must include the numerical value of each of the components;	Section 2.1, table 2	Section 2.1, table 2
2.4.3(5) If prices have changed from prices disclosed for the immediately preceding pricing year , explain the reasons for changes, and quantify the difference in respect of each of those reasons;	Section 5.1.	Section 5.2.
Revenue by Consumer Group 2.4.3(6) Where applicable, describe the method used by the GTB to allocate the target revenue among consumers , including the numerical values of the target revenue allocated to consumers and the rationale for allocating it in this way;	Section 3.3 and section 3.1	Section 3.3 and section 3.2
Revenue by Price Component 2.4.3(7) State the proportion of target revenue (if applicable) that is collected through each price component as publicly disclosed under clause 2.4.18.	Section 5	Section 5
Effect of Pricing Strategy 2.4.4 Every disclosure under clause 2.4.1 above must, if the GTB has a pricing strategy - (1) Explain the pricing strategy for the next 5 pricing years (or as close to 5 years as the pricing strategy allows), including the current pricing year for which prices are set; (2) Explain how and why prices are expected to change as a result of the pricing strategy ; (3) If the pricing strategy has changed from the preceding pricing year , identify the changes and explain the reasons for the changes.	Firstgas does currently not have a pricing strategy.	

Principle	Reference / description	
	Pricing methodology for MPOC	Pricing methodology for GTC
Prices for Non-Standard Contracts 2.4.5 Every disclosure under clause 2.4.1 above must- (1) Describe the approach to setting prices for non-standard contracts, including- (a) the extent of non-standard contract use, including the value of target revenue expected to be collected from consumers subject to non-standard contracts; (b) how the GTB determines whether to use a non-standard contract, including any criteria used; (c) any specific criteria or methodology used for determining prices for consumers subject to non-standard contracts, and the extent to which these criteria or that methodology is consistent with the Pricing Principles; (2) Describe the GTB's obligations and responsibilities (if any) to consumers subject to non-standard contracts in the event that the supply of gas transmission services to the consumer is interrupted. This description must explain- (a) the extent of the differences in the relevant terms between standard contracts and non-standard contracts; (b) any implications of this approach for determining prices for consumers subject to non-standard contracts.	Not applicable. Non-standard contracts are not available under the MPOC. Not applicable. Non-standard contracts are not available under the MPOC.	Section 3.5 Section 3.5

Appendix 3: Director certificate for Transmission Pricing Methodology

We, Fiona Ann Oliver and Mark Adrian Ratcliffe, being directors of First Gas Limited certify that, having made all reasonable enquiry, to the best of our knowledge:

- a) the following attached information of First Gas Limited prepared for the purposes of clause 2.4.1 of the *Gas Transmission Information Disclosure Determination 2012* in all material respects complies with that determination.
- b) The prospective financial or non-financial information included in the attached information has been forecast on a basis consistent with regulatory requirements or recognised industry standards.



Director: Fiona Ann Oliver



Director: Mark Adrian Ratcliffe

13 Aug, 2025 12:51:30 PM GMT+12

Date

13 Aug, 2025 12:55:12 PM GMT+12

Date